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Though relatively small, the subprime mortgage-backed securities market is often identified as 
the source of the crisis that swept through the U.S. financial system from 2007 onwards. We 
investigate if its role in the propagation of the crisis was due to contagion or interdependence. 
Using a Markov-switching VAR with time-varying transition probabilities, we analyze the 
transmission of shocks across the financial system. We find little evidence of asset correlation 
changes between normal and crisis regimes and those that do occur are predominantly associated 
with liquidity variables. Otherwise, relationships are stable across market conditions, implying 
that the U.S. financial crisis was due to cross-market interdependencies rather than contagion. 
There is limited evidence that the deteriorating quality of the underlying assets can explain the 
transition from 'normal' market conditions to a high-volatility regime although his is not 
consistent across model specifications. 
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I. Introduction
In 2007, increasing uncertainty regarding asset valuations and subsequent losses in the market for
subprime mortgage-backed securities heralded the onset of a severe financial crisis. Its repercus-
sions reverberated throughout the entire financial system, affecting stock markets, bond markets
(both corporate and sovereign), and short-term funding markets, firstly in the United States and
later across much of the international financial system. It is generally accepted that the market for
these mortgage-backed securities and other associated complex derivative instruments served as
the source of the initial shock that led to the widespread turmoil, see Gorton (2009), Brunnermeier
(2008) and Dungey, Dwyer and Flavin (2013) among others. This fledgling market had experienced
rapid growth in the five-year period preceding the crisis as investors chased high-yield invest-
ment opportunities. The ’tranche and ratings’ feature of these products appealed to investors,
particularly those with a mandate to hold only AAA-rated securities. Initially suppliers of these
asset-backed securities struggled to meet the growing demand, leading to increasingly lax lending
standards (Mian and Sufi, 2009) which further fuelled market growth. The share of subprime
mortgages increased from approximately 9% of new mortgages in the early 2000s to over 40% in
2006 (Hellwig, 2009) and subprime mortgage-backed security issuance almost doubled from $195
billion to $362.5 billion during the same period (Park, 2010).
However, this market remained a relatively small sector of the overall financial system. Dwyer and
Tkac (2009) estimate that, as of December 2006, its value represented approximately 1% of the total
value of global bond markets, stock markets and bank deposits. Therefore a key question that
emerges is just how did a shock to this relatively small sector lead to such widespread financial
market turmoil? This question is the focus of our paper. In particular, we aim to determine
if the spread of the crisis across the financial system was due to financial market contagion or
to other predictable factors. We employ an econometric model which allows us to test for two
different forms of contagion.1 Firstly, we turn to a definition of contagion proposed by Masson
1There is little consensus in the academic literature as to what exactly constitutes contagion. Claessens, Dornbusch and
Park (2000), Forbes and Rigobon (2002) and Dungey et al. (2010), among others, provide useful overviews of the different
definitions used in the literature.
2
(1999a,b), whereby a shock to one market can trigger a system-wide transition to a new, usually
bad, equilibrium. We investigate if the subprime mortgage-backed market acted as the driving
force behind the transition from tranquil conditions to the recent crisis state. The second, and
more often used, definition of contagion operates through the correlation channel. This seeks to
distinguish between contagion and market interdependencies. Interdependencies are defined as
market correlations that exist in all states of the world and arise due to standard asset market
linkages and exposure to common risk sources. Contagion, on the other hand, is a channel
that operates only during a crisis or following a large adverse shock. We employ a definition
of contagion that is consistent with that of Forbes and Rigobon (2002); namely that contagion
occurs when market correlations intensify during a crisis period in excess of what might be
expected given the interdependencies that exist during ’normal’ market conditions. Forbes (2012)
distils a number of theoretical channels through which contagion may arise. These include banks
and lending institutions; portfolio rebalancing following a shock; wake-up calls; and changes
in investor risk aversion.2 Banks and lending institutions that experience a negative shock may
respond by curtailing the supply of credit to other sectors and/or the real economy. The fact that
banks are often highly leveraged tends to amplify the initial shock, as shown by Van Wincoop
(2011) and Shin (2012). Investors may undertake portfolio rebalancing following a shock as they
sell-off ’good’ assets to meet cash requirements or to satisfy portfolio weight restrictions. Wake-up
calls refer to the tendency of financial market participants to reassess the riskiness of all asset
classes following a shock to one asset. This may lead to a period of retrenchment with sales of
assets whose perceived risk has grown. Related to this are changes to investors’ risk tolerance.
Following a shock to one asset, investors may demand a higher risk premium to hold other risky
assets, thereby leading to further portfolio rebalancing.
In this paper, we test for contagion from the U.S. subprime mortgage-backed securities market
to other sectors of the U.S. financial system during the recent crisis. We track the market for
mortgage-backed securities using the ABX.HE indexes (discussed in detail in the next section),
which were initially introduced with the aim of adding transparency to this predominantly over-
2Forbes (2012) also includes the international trade channel but we concentrate on different sectors of the U.S. financial
system so this is not relevant here.
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the-counter (OTC) market. The seminal work in testing for contagion from the ABX indexes is
due to Longstaff (2010) who focuses on the stability of relationships, i.e. the correlation-based
approach. We build on this study in a number of important ways. Our first innovation is to employ
a different, more suitable, econometric methodology which provides a clearer picture of the shock
transmission that characterised the financial system during the crisis period. We argue that the
standard vector autoregressive (VAR) approach of Longstaff (2010), which exogenously imposes
the crisis period, is not necessarily the best method to measure contagion and we instead estimate
a time-varying transition probability Markov-switching VAR (TVTP MS-VAR) model, as developed
by Filardo (1994).3 This has a number of advantages over the standard VAR. In our specification
of the model, we allow both the mean parameters and the asset variances to switch discretely
between two regimes. Regimes are determined endogenously by the data, giving a potentially
cleaner delineation between the ’crisis’ and ’non-crisis’ periods. The regime switch models the
heteroskedasticity of asset returns and overcomes the problem of assuming a constant covariance
matrix of return innovations. We examine the ’correlation channel’ of contagion by analysing
the stability of cross-market linkages between regimes. In particular, we test if our estimated
parameters change as we move from a low- to a high-volatility financial environment. Statistically
significant changes indicate instability in cross-market relationships and hence, financial market
contagion. If no such changes are detected, then we would conclude that market interdependencies
served to propagate the shock. Furthermore, we assess the role of the subprime mortgage-backed
market in explaining the transition of the financial system from one state to another. We do this
by allowing the time-varying probabilities to depend on asset returns from this sector and test if
they add explanatory power over the evolution of the crisis and trigger the turmoil.
Our second contribution is to provide a more holistic picture of the evolving cross-market rela-
tionships. Initially, and for comparability with Longstaff (2010), we concentrate on testing for
contagion from the subprime mortgage-backed market to government, corporate, money, volatility
and equity markets. We then proceed to assess the stability of all other cross-market linkages,
3Variants of this type of model have previously been employed in the currency crisis literature by Peria (2002), Mandilaris
and Bird (2010) and Brunetti et al. (2008), while Guo, Chen and Huang (2011) apply a MS-VAR model to test for contagion
between the market for credit default swaps (CDS), equity, real estate and energy markets.
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thereby building a more complete representation of the financial system during this tumultuous
episode. This extension provides some interesting insights into the sources of instability in the
U.S. financial system over the crisis period.
We conduct our analysis using the longest available continuously-traded ABX index. Although all
cross-market correlations intensify during the crisis regime, we find little evidence of contagion
from the subprime mortgage-backed asset market to other sectors of the financial system. In
fact, most evidence of contagious effects stem from liquidity variables and the VIX market. For
robustness, we repeat the analysis using a spliced index (as in Longstaff, 2010) to investigate if
our results are sensitive to the changing composition of this index. There is some evidence that it
has explanatory power over the determination of the regime path but it is not consistent across
different specifications. Overall, our findings suggest that cross-market interdependencies, and
not contagion, were central to the transmission of the initial subprime-mortgage market shock
across the U.S. financial system.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the data, paying special
attention to the ABX.HE indexes that we employ to track the U.S. subprime mortgage-backed mar-
ket. Section 3 presents our econometric methodology. Section 4 outlines our model specification,
reports and discusses our results, and presents a number of robustness checks. Finally, Section 5
contains our concluding remarks.
II. Data
II.1 The ABX.HE Indexes
The exceptional growth of the subprime mortgage-backed securities sector during the early 2000s
led to the creation of the ABX.HE indexes, standardized indexes that initially provided credibility,
transparency and liquidity to this relatively new and innovative structured finance market.4
4Stanton and Wallace (2011) provide an excellent overview of the ABX indexes and raise concerns about what drives
the prices of these indexes. However they remain the only publicly available data on subprime mortgage-backed assets
and have been used to analyse the market by Fender and Scheicher (2008), Longstaff (2010) and Dungey, Dwyer and Flavin
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Produced by the Markit Group, the first index was launched on January 19, 2006 (ABX 06-1).
Subsequently new indexes were introduced at six-monthly intervals, i.e. July 19, 2006 (ABX 06-2),
Jan 19, 2007 (ABX 07-1) and July 19, 2007 (ABX 07-2) until the underlying asset market became so
impaired that the fifth issue was postponed indefinitely and is now unlikely to take place. The
reason for rolling the indexes in this fashion was to provide information on prevailing conditions
in the subprime mortgage market but it also meant that the underlying asset quality could vary
from one vintage to another.
Each index tracks twenty equally weighted, static U.S. portfolios of credit default swaps (CDS)
backed by subprime mortgages, issued in the six-month period prior to the index launch date.
Each index adopts a Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO) structure with five distinct tranches,
covering specifically rated reference obligations. The asset/tranche ratings (AAA, AA, A, BBB,
and BBB-) are assigned in accordance with those issued by Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s
(S&P’s) with the lower rating chosen when the two agencies differ in their assessment of credit
quality. In order to be included in the index each residential mortgage-backed security (RMBS)
must meet stringent requirements, such as deal size must be at least $500 million, the weighted
average Fair Isaac Corporation (FICO) score of the creditors backing the securities issued in the
RMBS transaction may not be greater than 660 and at least four of the required tranches must be
registered pursuant to the U.S. Securities Act of 1933.5 Each index is a synthetic CDO in which
the ratings do not differentiate borrowers according to their risk profiles. Instead they simply
distinguish the order in which investors bear losses and receive payments. The misconception
that a AAA-rated ABX asset was equal to that of a AAA-rated corporate bond led many mandate-
driven bodies, such as pension funds and universities, to invest heavily in these securities.
Figure 1 plots ABX raw prices for each index from its issuance date until December 31, 2011.6
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
(2013), among others.
5In the U.S. an individual’s credit risk is commonly measured by a FICO score. These scores range from 300 to 850 and
are based on analysis of the individual’s credit history. A mortgage issued to a borrower with a FICO score of 620 or less is
classified as a subprime mortgage.
6Note that as each index was issued six months subsequent to the previous vintage the data are unbalanced.
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There is clearly a steep decline in prices in all four indexes over the sample period. As the
subprime deals underlying the ABX 06-1 index were issued in the second half of 2005 the assets
underlying this index would be of considerably better quality than those included in later issued
indexes.7 It is clear that all assets in this index traded at or near par for all of 2006 before declining
rapidly during 2007, a trend replicated in the other three indexes. However, the AAA-rated asset
in the ABX 06-1 index does not reach the lows of later issued assets of equivalent credit rating,
highlighting that the later issued indexes were of deteriorating quality (with an associated increase
in risk) and consequently were hardest hit during the crisis. However, the AAA-rated assets of all
indexes are clearly differentiated from the other tranches of any given vintage. The tranches rated
below AAA all suffer huge losses and are hardly distinguishable by the sample end.
Given that our main focus is on measuring contagion emanating from this market, an important
choice must be made between the subprime mortgage-backed assets. We choose to work with
the returns (measured as the difference in the logarithm of each index) on AAA-rated assets as
the relative size of this tranche swamped the other tranches in many of the underlying structured
products. Also, as we can see from Figure 1, the AAA-tranche was the most liquid tranche in
each index and therefore provides a truer reflection of market conditions for this sector. We use
two alternative series. Firstly, we include the longest available AAA-rated variable, namely that
from the January 2006 index. Secondly we replicate the spliced index of Longstaff (2010), who
constructs an on-the-run ABX index, by splicing the series together at each issuance date, i.e. 19
July 2006, 19 January 2007 and 19 July 2007. While it could be argued that the spliced series better
reflects the prevailing conditions in the market, there are also some potential pitfalls associated
with this approach. Dungey, Dwyer and Flavin (2013) argue that, given the differences in the
underlying assets and their risk profiles, the various indexes are not suitable for splicing and
should be treated as separate assets. Furthermore, as our definition of correlation-based contagion
is ’a statistically significant change in asset relationships between crisis and non-crisis periods’,
the changing composition of the spliced index could potentially obscure asset linkages over time
and bias our conclusions. Using both series allows us to assess if differences between the traded
7Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2011) document a gradual, but persistent, decline in the quality of subprime loans from
2001 to 2007.
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and the spliced series are important in generating our results. The ABX data have been obtained
from the Markit Group Ltd. and daily returns are used in the analysis. The sample period ranges
from January 19, 2006, to December 31, 2011.
II.2 Financial Market Variables
To cover the various sectors of the U.S. financial system, and to compare our findings to those of
Longstaff (2010), our empirical application includes variables from equity, corporate debt, U.S.
Treasury, liquidity and volatility markets, as well as the subprime mortgage-backed market. Since
we employ a range of model specifications and robustness checks, the following variables are all
utilised at various points in the analysis. The U.S. equity market is represented by the returns
on the S&P 500 index and/or a sub-index of financial stocks. Conditions in the corporate debt
market are measured by the changes in spreads of the rates on Aaa- and Baa-rated debt over the
10-year Treasury rate. Our Treasury market proxies attempt to capture both long- and short-term
interest rate changes so we use the change in both the one- and 10-year Treasury rates. Financial
market liquidity is captured by two variables, namely the change in the Libor-OIS spread and
the change in the rate charged on 30-day asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP). The former
reflects conditions in the interbank market while the latter represents the market for short-term
funding.8 The VIX index of implied volatility, computed from options on the S&P 500, serves as
our volatility market variable. The change in the VIX index reflects the changing expectations
of future market uncertainty and is our chosen volatility proxy. Treasury and corporate yield
data and the Libor-OIS spread have been obtained from the Federal Reserve Board while S&P, the
ABCP and VIX data have been obtained from the Bloomberg system. As with the ABX indexes the
financial market variables data range from January 19, 2006, to December 31, 2011.
Given the relatively short data sample available to us, we choose to work with daily data, rather
than the weekly sampling employed by Longstaff (2010). The fast and furious nature of the changes
during the crisis period is probably better captured by higher frequency data. Furthermore, the
8We introduce the ABCP variable following the findings of Pelizzon and Sartore (2013) who show the importance of
this market in determining interbank rates during the recent crisis.
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econometric methodology employed in this study (outlined below) is better able to distinguish
between regimes with more available data points.
II.3 Summary statistics
Table 1 reports summary statistics for daily returns of the ABX indexes and changes to the financial
variables under analysis over the sample period.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Over the whole sample, the mean returns on each of the ABX assets are negative and decreasing
in credit quality. Consistent with Figure 1, losses on the lower-rated tranches are much more
pronounced than those for their higher-rated counterparts. All tranches with a credit rating lower
than AAA suffer returns that are at least three times more negative than the most senior, AAA-
rated, asset. In general, the volatility of the asset returns are inversely related to the credit rating
of the asset, though the BBB- asset of the ABX 06-1 index violates this trend. Volatility increases
more than 100% for the traded 06-1 and 37% for the spliced index as the ratings decline from AAA
to BBB-. Comparing the traded index to the spliced index, the returns are always more negative
and usually more volatile on the spliced index. This is due to the fact that the spliced index is
composed of different asset vintages and is based on the ABX 07-2 index for almost three quarters
of the sample. This index, whose underlying deals were struck when property prices were already
in decline and subprime mortgages were quickly falling into negative equity, suffered the sharpest
decline of all the subprime mortgage-backed assets and greatly influences the behaviour of the
spliced index. All returns are negatively skewed, consistent with the realisation of more adverse
shocks than incidences of good news. Finally, all assets display significant leptokurtosis, indicating
the presence of fat tails in their distributions. This may signal that the asset returns are better
modelled as a mixture of distributions or by a regime-switching framework. The financial variables
also highlight some interesting features of the markets during this period. Firstly, the financial
sector of the equity market generates negative mean returns, while the return on the market as
a whole is slightly positive. Furthermore, financial stock returns exhibit far more volatility than
the market index. The mean returns on both Treasury instruments are mildly negative over the
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sample, reflecting the series of interest rate cuts introduced to encourage investment during the
recessionary period. Changes in corporate spreads average out at close to zero, though there is
higher volatility associated with the Aaa-rated sector, possibly due to the fact that these remained
relatively more liquid during the crisis. Likewise changes to the VIX, the ABCP rate, and the
Libor-OIS spread are negligible, on average, over the sample. Again all assets display evidence of
being subjected to large shocks of either sign (kurtosis) and significant asymmetries (skewness)
over the time period.
III. The econometric methodology
Longstaff (2010) estimates a VAR model for each phase of the crisis and compares the relationships
between variables across these different time periods. The main advantage of the VAR framework is
that it is flexible enough to allow a relatively large number of assets to be considered simultaneously.
However, it also has a number of limitations. Firstly the crisis dates must be imposed exogenously.
This is often a contentious issue in assigning both the start and end dates, e.g. in recent studies
of the subprime crisis, Longstaff (2010) uses the calendar year of 2007 as the crisis period, while
many others use a later start date of July or August of that year (see Dungey et al., 2009; Hatemi-J
and Roca, 2011; among others). Secondly, this type of approach treats all days within the defined
crisis period equally, even though there will most likely be many days without significant news
for the financial markets. Thirdly, a model that is capable of modelling the heteroskedasticity
generated by regime shifts is likely to be more efficient and provide a better characterisation of
financial crises than a standard VAR approach. Hamilton (1989, 1990) popularised the use of
Markov-switching models in economic studies. Their application within the contagion literature
has also become more common (Jeanne and Masson, 2000; Gravelle, Kichian and Morley, 2006;
Flavin and Panopoulou, 2010; among others).
We wish to retain the flexibility of the VAR model while overcoming the limitations outlined
above. Thus, the Markov-switching VAR (MS-VAR) appears to be ideally suited to our needs. It
allows the crisis dates to be selected endogenously, accounts for no-news days within the turbulent
period and models the heteroskedasticity of financial assets within the regime-switching structure.
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We employ a two-state MS-VAR, with our two discrete states denoted as s1 and s2. s1 represents a
low-volatility, ’non-crisis’ regime while s2 represents a high-volatility, ’crisis’ regime. A two-regime
model is chosen due to the relatively short length of our data and it provides a tractable framework
within which to apply our definition of correlation-based contagion, i.e. a significant increase in
cross-market linkages following a shock in one market, and to test for its presence. Our model
takes the following form:
yi,t = α(st) +
K
∑
k=1
βk(st)yi,t−k + esti,t, (1)
st ∈ {1, 2} ,
esti,t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, σ2s ),
in which yi,t is an n dimensional time series vector of dependent variables, α is a matrix of state
dependent intercepts, β1 . . . βk are matrices of the state dependent autoregressive coefficients and
capture the relationships between our financial variables, and esti,t is a state dependent noise vector,
which has a zero mean and constant variance within each regime. st is an unobserved random
variable that signals the switch from regime to another. Since the true regime cannot be observed,
we must specify the paths by which the regimes transit from one to another. We assume st follows
a first-order Markov process in which the current regime, st relies only on the regime one period
in the past, st−1.
Early Markov-switching regime models imposed a fixed transition probability (FTP) on the
movement between states but this was relaxed by Filardo (1994). He proposed a methodology
which allows the transition probabilities to vary over time and be modelled as functions of
chosen information variables, i.e. a variable that triggers the switch in regime. This time-varying
transition probability (TVTP) specification nests the FTP model and allows us to test if the
conditioning variables have explanatory power over the regime switches. In our application, this
provides a natural way to test for the type of contagion proposed by Masson (1999a,b). However,
the information variable must be selected carefully. Filardo (1998) details the conditions that
this variable must satisfy. The information variable must, in general, be uncorrelated with the
contemporaneous regime and thus consequently, most empirical applications of the TVTP model
select lagged, pre-determined, variables upon which to condition the regime path. Thus the
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regimes paths evolve according to a first order Markov-chain and are directly affected by the
information variable zt−l :
p[st = 1|t−1 = 1] = p11(zt−l),
p[st = 2|t−1 = 2] = p22(zt−l),
p[st = 2|t−1 = 1] = p12(zt−l),
p[st = 1|t−1 = 2] = p21(zt−l), (2)
in which pij denotes the probability that the system is in state i at time t-1 and in state j at time
t. In common with much of the applied literature, we model the transition probabilities as a
logistical functional form:
p11(zt−l) =
exp(θ0 +∑Ll=1 θlzt−l)
1+ exp(θ0 +∑Ll=1 θlzt−l)
,
p22(zt−l) =
exp(γ0 +∑Ll=1 γlzt−l)
1+ exp(γ0 +∑Ll=1 γlzt−l)
. (3)
The FTP alternative is nested within the TVTP model. In particular, for L = 1, if the θ1 and
γ1 parameters are jointly zero, then the TVTP model collapses to the FTP model. The model is
estimated using the Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm, as described in Hamilton (1990).
IV. Estimated models and results
IV.1 Model specification
As our model is highly nonlinear, we aim for a parsimonious representation of the U.S. financial
system. Our initial analysis is performed on a six variable system with each variable selected to
represent a particular sector of the financial system. The subprime asset-backed securities market
is represented by the highest-rated and longest-traded ABX tranche available, i.e. the AAA-rated
tranche of the ABX 06-1 index. We also employ, in a separately estimated model, the spliced index.
We feel that the continuously-traded asset is more suited to tests of contagion but using both
allows us to assess if the choice of traded or spliced data is important in explaining the results.
The S&P 500 index and the change in the Aaa-rated corporate spread over Treasuries are taken to
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represent the equity and corporate debt markets respectively. Conditions in the market for U.S.
Treasuries are captured by the change in the one-year Treasury rate, while the general financial
market environment is proxied by a liquidity variable, the change in the Libor-OIS spread, and
the change in the VIX index.
Given the large number of parameters to be estimated in our six variable system, we are mindful
of not including too many lags in the MS-VAR model. We began our analysis with four lags (K = 4
in Eq. 1) but due to the non-significance of any of the fourth lags, we reduced the dimensionality
of the system to K = 3. This procedure was repeated until finally settling on two lags, K = 2.
Finally, we select the information variable that potentially influences the regime paths. As we
are primarily interested in the effect of the subprime-mortgage backed sector on the broader
financial system, we turn to our ABX assets to select this trigger variable. Ideally, we would like
an exogenous variable. Since we include the AAA-rated asset as an endogenous variable in the
MS-VAR, we prefer to select a variable from outside of the system. We therefore turn to the returns
on the AA-rated asset of the ABX 06-1 index (or the spliced index, when appropriate). However,
the AA-rated asset cannot really be thought of as being truly uncorrelated with the state of the
system so, in our application, we use the first lag of this variable, i.e. we set L = 1 in Eq. 3. Thus,
our TVTP MS-VAR analysis includes the AAA-rated asset within the VAR model, with regime
changes dependent upon the lagged behaviour of the AA-rated asset.9
IV.2 Discussion of results
Initially, we focus on the ability of the information variable to predict the regime switches in our
model. In particular, we test the hypothesis that the lagged return on the AA-rated asset contains
no information relevant to the determination of the regime which, if true, would imply that there
is no evidence of contagion from the subprime mortgage-backed market. We perform a likelihood
ratio (LR) test in which our null hypothesis is that θ1 = γ1 = 0.
9Our results are not dependent on the choice of information variable. We check their robustness by selecting other
tranches of the ABX index and it does not alter our conclusions.
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[Insert Table 2 about here]
Though the signs of the coefficients on the information variable make intuitive sense with the
positive θ1 and negative γ1 implying that good (bad) news in the ABX market increases the
probability of being in the non-crisis (crisis) regime, these coefficients are not significantly different
from zero. Consequently, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that θ1 and γ1 are jointly zero.
This implies that the lagged return on the ABX asset is not informative in predicting the regime
switches over the period and therefore provides no evidence that contagion from this market was
an important factor leading to the widespread financial market turmoil experienced.
Table 2 also presents the expected values and volatility of all assets. We classify the regimes
by analysing the volatility of the variables in each state. There is no ambiguity as the volatility
of all assets increases substantially in state 2, allowing us to easily identify this as the crisis
period. Table 2 also shows that, as we move from the non-crisis to the crisis regime, the sign of
the constant terms changes for every asset. The non-crisis period is characterised by statistically
significant positive changes to the prices of the subprime mortgage-backed asset and equity, while
the Libor-OIS spread is on average decreasing. Though not statistically significant at conventional
levels, this period is typified by negative changes to the Aaa-rated corporate spread and the VIX
index, while daily changes in the one-year Treasury rate are approximately zero. In contrast,
the only statistically significant coefficient in the crisis period suggests a declining rate on the
one-year Treasury bill as the Federal Reserve aggressively cut interest rates. The other estimates
suggest negative equity and ABX returns, increasing corporate debt yields and short-term funding
costs as well as greater uncertainty about the future financial environment were all features of the
turbulent period.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Table 3 presents the regime-specific correlations between each pair of assets. We report these
simply to illustrate the changes in asset co-movements between regimes and they should not be
interpreted as evidence of contagion. The lower triangle of Table 3 contains those correlations
which pertain to the non-crisis period with the corresponding numbers for the crisis period
reported on the upper triangle. Focussing initially on the ABX asset, we see that in both regimes it
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has positive co-movement with changes in the equity market and with the one-year Treasury rate
but is negatively related to changes in the Aaa corporate spread, the Libor-OIS spread and the
VIX index. Interestingly the magnitude of its correlation with each of the other assets intensifies
during the crisis regime. This pattern is generally true for the other assets in the system but there
are some exceptions. The increases in the absolute value of the pairwise correlations are a feature
of high-volatility crisis periods (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002) and while it may suggest a change in
cross-market relationships, we require further analysis before we can conclude if this constitutes
contagion or not.
To undertake this analysis, we first plot the smoothed probabilities of the system being in a crisis
regime. We calculate these probabilities as follows:
P(st = i|FT ; θ), i = 1, 2, (4)
in which FT denotes the collection of all observed variables up to and including time T, i.e.
all information in the sample and θ is the vector of parameters (α(s), βk(s), σ2s , p11, p22, p12, p21).
Smoothed estimates are then computed via the backward recursion algorithm as presented by
Kim (1994) and Hamilton (1994).
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
Figure 2 shows the smoothed probability of the system being in a crisis regime and suggests
that the watershed of regimes occurred about July 2007. This starting point coincides with that
employed by Dungey et al. (2009) and Hatemi-J and Roca (2011) but contrasts with the earlier start
date of Longstaff (2010). It depicts how the early part of 2007 was predominantly a tranquil time
in the financial markets and therefore highlights the danger of employing this calendar year as the
’subprime crisis’ period, since it is a mixture of two different states of the world. Therefore treating
it as a single episode masks potentially important changes occurring between regimes. The crisis
persists for roughly two years before the non-crisis period re-establishes itself as the more likely
regime in early-2009. Another interesting feature of Figure 2 is that even within the crisis period,
there are a number of days when markets returned to a state of tranquillity, especially during the
second quarter of 2008. This was possibly due to little news or thin trading on those days, so it is
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important not to include such days in our crisis sample since they may dilute the true intensity of
the shock transmission during the turbulent episode.
Finally, we address the main issue; do the results of our analysis produce evidence of contagious
effects transmitting the crisis across financial markets or can interdependencies between these
sectors account for the widespread financial turmoil? The former is characterised by parameter
instability between regimes whereas the latter would yield stable relationships. Table 4 presents
the p-values from a likelihood ratio test where the null hypothesis is that the VAR coefficients do
not change as we move between regimes, i.e. βij,k(s = 1) = βij,k(s = 2), where i and j represent
the assets under consideration, k the lag and i 6= j.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
We first concentrate on the transmission channels from the AAA-rated subprime mortgage-backed
asset to the other sectors of the financial system. In contrast to Longstaff (2010), we find no
statistical evidence of a change in the relationship between the ABX asset and any of the other
assets under consideration during the crisis period. Hence we conclude against the presence of
contagion. Similarly, there is no evidence of contagion from the other assets to the ABX asset.
Thus, it appears to be interdependence between markets that propagated the initial shock to the
subprime mortgage-backed sector across the U.S. financial system. The responses of other markets
to this shock could have been anticipated if the degree of cross-market integration or interdepen-
dence had been properly recognised. In a study of international stock markets, Brière, Chapelle
and Szafarz (2012) reach a similar conclusion regarding the spread of crises. The international
transmission of shocks is attributed to globalisation rather than to contagion.
We continue to analyse the remainder of the system and find limited evidence of contagion. In
fact, the only evidence produced that is consistent with different relationships between crisis and
non-crisis periods relates to the liquidity variable, Libor-OIS, and the VIX. Our results suggest
that there was contagion from the Libor-OIS spread to both the corporate debt market and the
VIX index. This finding is consistent with Guo (2013) who documents the sensitivity of credit
spreads to both liquidity risk and information uncertainty. Furthermore the relationship between
the VIX and the S&P also intensified during the crisis period. All other relationships remain stable
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between regimes.
At first, the lack of evidence of contagion in the U.S. financial system may appear confusing
given the widespread turmoil experienced. The majority of pairwise relationships remained stable
during this transition, implying that ultimately the negative returns, higher spreads, reduced
liquidity and increased uncertainty were due to the strong interdependence of the various sectors
of the financial system rather than to contagion. Given the relationships that existed between the
ABX asset and the other variables during ’normal’ market conditions, then if one had correctly
anticipated the magnitude of the downturn in the asset-backed market, one should also have
expected the changes to the other assets. The only evidence of excessive shock transmission stems
from the liquidity variable to the corporate debt and volatility markets and from the VIX to the
equity market. In these instances, the responses in the recipient markets to liquidity and volatility
shocks were greater than could have been anticipated based on non-crisis relationships. These
excessive responses provide us with limited evidence of contagion.
We undertake a number of robustness checks. Firstly, we change the composition of the six-variable
vector, yt. In particular, we replace the S&P 500 index with the S&P subindex of financial stocks. In
another application, we change our liquidity variable to the change in the ABCP rate. We analyze
many different combinations - though not an exhaustive set of combinations - and our conclusions
do not change. There is no evidence of contagion from (or to) the subprime mortgage-backed
market. We continue to see evidence of contagion from the liquidity variable though the evidence
from the ABCP rate is less compelling than from the Libor-OIS spread.10 We also investigate the
role of the spliced ABX index and finally look at the evidence from more parsimonious models.
These results are discussed in the following subsections.
IV.3 Robustness checks with the Spliced index
Given the disparity between our results and those of Longstaff (2010), we repeat our analysis using
the spliced series, instead of the traded asset, as our proxy for the subprime mortgage asset-backed
10To conserve space, we do not report these results but they are available from the authors.
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market. We wish to investigate if using this series produces more evidence of contagion since
the composition of the reference assets change on each splicing date and, consequently, differ
between crisis and non-crisis periods. As argued earlier, the quality of the assets underlying the
index deteriorated across vintage of issue so, a priori, we cannot rule out that the splicing together
of these different vintages may artificially induce changes in the relationships among variables
between different regimes.
We re-estimate the model and our results are contained in Figure 3 and Tables 5-7. Given
the similarity of results, we briefly sketch our main findings here, paying attention to areas of
difference.
[Insert Figure 3 and Tables 5-7 about here]
The most important difference is the role of the information variable in determining the regime
path. Unlike the traded asset, the return on the spliced AA-rated ABX asset exerts a statistically
significant influence on the transition probabilities. Again the coefficients signs are intuitively
correct and we reject the null hypothesis that θ1 and γ1 are jointly zero. In fact, only θ1 is individ-
ually significant, suggesting that the subprime mortgage-backed market influenced the switch
to the crisis but not the subsequent exit from the turmoil. The role of the ABX asset return in
the determination of the regime switch to the high-volatility, crisis state is consistent with the
definition of contagion proposed by Masson (1999a,b). This finding may be attributed to the
declining quality of the assets underlying the later issues of the ABX indexes. The deterioration in
the quality of subprime mortgages, declines in real estate prices and the increased uncertainty
surrounding the associated securitized financial products, impacted greatly on the 2007 issues
of the ABX indexes and appear to have acted as a catalyst for the crisis that swept through the
financial system. We investigate this hypothesis in more detail below.
The remaining results for the spliced index are similar to before. The start of the crisis period is
the same - July 2007 - but its duration is slightly longer, by just a couple of months. It is worth
bearing in mind that the entire crisis period is represented by the AAA-rated tranche of the final
vintage of the ABX index and all deals underlying this issuance were struck in the first half of
2007. This issue suffered steeper declines than the 2006 issue employed in the previous analysis,
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which may explain the slightly longer crisis duration between Figures 2 and 3.
The change in sign for the expected returns and increased volatilities for all assets are again
observed as the financial markets transit from ’normal’ conditions to the high-volatility state (Table
5) and the pattern in correlations is also unchanged (Table 6). More importantly, and despite our
reservations about using the spliced series, our conclusions regarding contagion remain unaltered.
There is still no evidence of contagion either to or from the subprime mortgage asset-backed
market (Table 7). Its role appears to be confined to triggering the crisis episode and then through
its interdependence with the other sectors of the U.S. financial system. The same pattern of
contagion is also confirmed with evidence of contagion from the liquidity variable to corporate
debt and volatility markets and from the VIX to the equity index.
We undertake further analysis to investigate the hypothesis that factors captured by the spliced,
but not the ABX 06-1, index (such as declining lending standards and poorer loan quality) are
important in triggering the regime switch. We estimate a model with the AAA-rated asset of
the continuously-traded 06-1 index included in the vector of dependent variables but specify
the spliced variable as the information variable governing the regime path. This allows us to
shed light on whether or not the difference in results reported above are really driven by the
deteriorating conditions in the subprime-mortgage market. Table 8 reports the results of the tests
that the information variable has no explanatory power over the determination of regime switches.
[Insert Table 8 about here]
Panel A refers to the full six-variable model. Over the whole sample, we fail to find a statistically
significant relationship between the spliced information variable and the regime path. Just as
in the earlier model with the continuously-traded asset, we conclude against the presence of
contagion. To gain a better understanding of how the later vintages affect the evolution of regimes,
we undertake further analysis by restricting the sample to exclude the earlier issues. For example,
we start the sample at July 20, 2006 so that the first vintage will be excluded from the spliced
variable and repeat the exercise until only the final vintage (07-2) remains. This estimation strategy
obviously omits important information from the sample and thus results should be treated with
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caution. But, it does allow us to assess the importance of later vintages and provides an indication
of what may be driving our results. When 2006-issued indices are included in the sample, the
information variable does not explain the regime switches. However, when the sample begins in
2007, the later vintages exert a statistically significant influence on the regime path. This provides
some evidence that the later vintages of the spliced index help to determine the state of the system.
On balance, we conclude that there is very limited evidence of contagion in our findings. There is
no evidence, whatsoever, that the cross-market relationships involving the subprime mortgage-
backed market were unstable between regimes. Thus, it would appear that market interdependence,
and not contagion, was the main transmission mechanism of the crisis. There is some evidence
that the subprime market was a trigger variable for the transition of the financial system to a new
bad equilibrium. However, over the full sample, this is limited to the model using spliced indices
in the vector of dependent variables and as the information variable. This finding does not hold
when the continuously-traded asset is used to represent the subprime backed market. Restricting
the sample suggests that later vintages are more successful in predicting the regime path but their
is influence is diluted in the full time period.
IV.4 Systems of smaller dimension
Given our results pertaining to the stability of cross-market relationships, a remaining doubt is
that our failure to reject the hypothesis of ’no contagion’ may be due to the large number of
parameters that need to be estimated simultaneously. A highly nonlinear model such as the TVTP
MS-VAR can be quite sensitive to the inclusion of many variables and lags (Manzan, 2004). The
lack of precision of these estimates may result in our model having low power to reject the null
hypothesis. We address this potential problem by estimating a range of smaller systems. Of
course, we acknowledge that in so doing we may expose ourselves to an omitted variables problem
but given the sparse evidence of any cross-market predictability in the six variable model, we
proceed to analyse the models of smaller dimension. In particular, we estimate models based on
assets from a particular sector of the financial system and, since we are ultimately concerned with
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measuring contagion from the subprime mortgage asset-backed market, we include the return
on the AAA-rated tranche of the January 2006 issue of the ABX index in all specifications. The
Libor-OIS spread is also included since the original model identifies this as the main source of
contagion. The information variable employed is the return on the traded AA-rated tranche of the
06-1 index.11 We deal with each of these sectors in turn and only report the results of our tests for
contagion.12 Table 9 presents our results.
[Insert Table 9 about here]
IV.4.1 Equity markets
We begin with equity markets and estimate a four variable MS-VAR model with two lags, in which
the variables analysed are the return on the S&P 500 index, the return on S&P financial index,
changes in the Libor-OIS spread and the return on the AAA-rated ABX 06-1 asset. Results are
reported in panel A of Table 9. As in the larger model, we find no evidence of either form of
contagion. The lagged AA-asset return is unable to predict the regime switch and all relationships
involving the subprime mortgage asset-backed market appear stable between regimes. The only
evidence of contagion again stems from the Libor-OIS variable and is transmitted to the index of
financial stocks, with the liquidity shortage exerting a larger than anticipated negative influence
on the financial sector.
IV.4.2 Corporate debt markets
Again we use a four variable specification. For corporate debt markets, we use the change in the
spread over 10-year Treasuries on both the Aaa- and Baa-rated bonds. Results are contained in
panel B of Table 9. Once more, the subprime mortgage-backed asset plays no role in determining
the regime path. We detect a statistically significant change in the relationship between the
subprime mortgage asset and the Aaa-rated corporate spread. However, upon closer inspection,
we find that it is due to a weakening of the relationship between the two assets in the crisis period.
11For completeness, we re-estimate all models using the spliced AA-rated asset as the information variable. Results are
presented Table 8 (Panel B). Since the pattern does not change, we restrict our discussion to the results presented in Table 9.
12All results are available on request.
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The sum of the coefficients changes from 0.0325 to 0.0075 and, in fact, the coefficient on the second
lag is negative for the high-volatility regime. Thus the changing relationship is more consistent
with a ’flight-to-quality’ type effect rather than contagion. It makes sense that investors, keen
to flee the asset-backed market, would turn to highly rated corporate debt in a bid to protect
their portfolio investments. Interestingly, we detect uni-directional contagion between the bond
classes. Shocks to the Baa-rated bond result in greater than anticipated responses in its Aaa-rated
counterpart. This may be due to decreasing confidence in the ratings or just heightened sensitivity
in the latter. There is also evidence of contagion from the liquidity variable to both corporate debt
instruments, though the change in the relationship is only marginally significant (p-value = 0.07)
in the case of Aaa-rated bond. In both cases the spread increases during the crisis as pressure
on short-term funds adversely affected the corporate debt market more than could have been
expected during ’normal’ financial market conditions.
IV.4.3 U.S. Treasury market
In analysing the relationship between the subprime mortgage-backed market, the Libor-OIS, and
the market for U.S. Treasuries, we capture both the short- and long-end of the U.S. Treasury yield
curve by including both the daily change in the rate on one-year and 10-year Treasuries. Panel C of
Table 9 displays our results. Interestingly the information variable becomes marginally significant
here. In the smaller system without equity or corporate debt variables, the lagged ABX variable
helps to predict the evolution of the regime path. This is a feature of the reduced-dimension
models that exclude corporate funding markets. Once more, cross-market relationships involving
the subprime-backed asset appear stable between regimes and hence we find no support for the
correlaton channel of contagion. This is in contrast to the liquidity variable whose relationship with
both of the Treasury instruments changes between regimes. The pattern of change is interesting
with the relationship between Libor-OIS and the shorter-term instrument becoming significantly
more negative. This implies that liquidity shortages led to greater than expected cuts in the
one-year Treasury rates as the Federal Reserve aggressively cut rates in an effort to combat the
developing crisis. On the other hand, the Libor-OIS and 10-year Treasury relationship becomes
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less negative, suggesting that liquidity shortages did not impact on the longer-maturity bonds
as much as expected. The falls in the long rates were less than predicted by ’normal’ market
relationships and may have been offset by the increasing economic risk. This shows an important
distinction between the sensitivity of short- and long-term Treasuries to liquidity shocks. Of further
interest is that the relationship changes are bi-directional. Again, there are subtle differences in
the way Libor-OIS responds to shocks in Treasuries of different maturities. The response of the
liquidity variable to a cut in the one-year rate becomes significantly more negative, suggesting that
surprise cuts at the short end of the Treasury curve did not have the desired effect of restoring
liquidity to the banking sector. In contrast, changes in the 10-year Treasury rate have no effect on
Libor-OIS during the high-volatility regime, again reinforcing the idea that changes to long rates
are ineffective during a liquidity shortfall. The failure of Treasury rate cuts to reverse liquidity is
probably due to the uncertainty that often surrounded government policy during the turbulent
period and the ensuing hoarding of liquid assets that took place by many financial institutions.
IV.4.4 Short-term liquidity markets
A trivariate MS-VAR is employed to assess the stability of linkages between the subprime mort-
gage asset-backed market, the Libor-OIS spread and the market for 30-day ABCP. The latter two
variables are selected for their ability to capture liquidity conditions in the financial markets.
We document our results in Panel D of Table 9. Interestingly, there is no evidence of changing
relationships involving the ABX asset but there is strong bi-directional evidence of contagion
between the two liquidity markets. Adverse liquidity shocks produce positive and higher than
anticipated changes to the rates on 30-day ABCP, while adverse shocks to the ABCP market lead
to greater impairment of the interbank market than predicted by ’normal’ market relationships.
The reinforcing effects of these two markets are consistent with the severe liquidity shortages
experienced in the market, especially after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008.
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IV.4.5 Volatility market
Finally, we estimate a trivariate model of ABX returns, Libor-OIS, and the change in the VIX index.
Panel E of Table 9 presents our findings. Here we find the only evidence of contagious effects from
the subprime mortgage-backed asset, although it is only marginally significant with a p-value of
0.08. Therefore the only direct evidence of correlation contagion from this sector appears to be a
relatively weak transmission of excess future economic uncertainty as implied by option prices.
Again we find evidence of contagion from the liquidity market to the VIX. All other relationships
are stable between regimes.
The pattern that emerges from this analysis is that the subprime mortgage-backed market played
little role in causing the financial crisis. Once corporate equity or debt is incorporated into the
system, the effect of the ABX variable is subsumed and plays no role in driving the system to
the high-volatility regime. Likewise for the correlation channel, there is little evidence that it
transmitted contagious effects to other markets, with possibly the exception of the volatility market.
Its relationships with other sectors of the U.S. financial system remained stable between regimes
and therefore we conclude that it was interdependence between markets that propagated the
initial shock across the system. Interestingly, the liquidity variable generates most evidence of
contagion. Its relationships often change as markets transit from a ’normal’ to a high-volatility
regime. Thus, the excessive or unpredictable reaction of the other sectors during the crisis period
appears to be predominantly driven by shocks to liquidity markets rather than the market for
subprime mortgage-backed securities.
V. Conclusions
We analyse the role of the subprime mortgage-backed market in causing the widespread turmoil
experienced in the U.S. financial system from 2007-09. We employ a TVTP MS-VAR methodology
which allows us to assess pairwise relationships across various sectors of the financial system. We
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analyze two forms of contagion; firstly, contagion that gives rise to statistically significant changes
in cross-market relationships between the crisis and the non-crisis regimes and secondly contagion
that results from a particular variable driving the system to a new (bad) equilibrium . A number
of striking findings emerge from the study. Firstly, we find little or no evidence of contagion
through the correlation channel emanating from the subprime mortgage-backed market. Over a
variety of model specifications and robustness checks, we consistently fail to find evidence of a
statistically significant change in the relationships between this market and other sectors of the
financial system. Initially, this may seem surprising. However, the crashes in other markets appear
to be a consequence of the high degree of interdependence in the financial system rather than any
excessive reaction to the shock in the subprime asset-backed sector. Secondly, where any contagion
is detected it tends to originate from our liquidity variables, the Libor-OIS spread and/or the
change in the 30-day ABCP rate. Previously, liquidity problems in the aftermath of the collapse of
Lehman Brothers have been attributed to transmitting the crisis internationally (Brunnermeier,
2008; Aït-Sahalia et al., 2009; among others) but here we show that shocks to liquidity variables
were also instrumental in exacerbating the crisis across the U.S. financial system. Thirdly, there is
limited evidence that deteriorating conditions in the subprime mortgage-backed market helped
to predict the transition between regimes. However this result is not consistent across model
specifications and, over the full sample, only applies to models that employ the spliced index and
not the actual traded asset.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Data set Rating Obs. Mean Std.dev. Skewness Kurtosis
ABX 06-1 index AAA 1552 -0.006 0.798 -1.065 23.731
AA 1552 -0.046 1.860 -0.201 16.755
A 1552 -0.130 1.931 -0.776 13.792
BBB 1552 -0.182 1.958 -2.732 24.219
BBB- 1552 -0.176 1.788 -2.272 20.626
Spliced ABX index AAA 1552 -0.057 1.607 -0.086 12.839
AA 1552 -0.187 1.942 -2.393 27.827
A 1552 -0.199 1.842 -1.230 9.748
BBB 1552 -0.227 2.217 -1.122 8.126
BBB- 1552 -0.224 2.211 -1.067 6.299
Financial market variables S&P 500 1552 0.0051 1.484 -0.468 6.518
S&P financials 1552 -0.0398 2.745 -0.081 8.636
One-year T-bill 1552 -0.0027 0.048 -0.154 25.368
10-year T-bond 1552 -0.0018 0.0679 -0.214 3.061
Aaa spread 1552 0.0005 0.089 -0.093 4.445
Baa spread 1552 0.00096 0.037 2.079 18.206
VIX 1552 0.0002 2.146 0.653 13.138
ABCP 1552 -0.0028 0.143 1.544 73.185
Libor-OIS 1552 0.00001 0.038 0.220 35.158
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for the daily percentage changes for the indicated ABX indexes
and financial market variables over the entire sample period. The sample consists of daily data from January
20, 2006 to December 31, 2011. Obs. denotes number of observations; Std.dev. denotes standard deviation.
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Table 2: Model Estimates for Transition Probabilities, Expected Values and Standard Deviations: Analysis
using Traded ABX 06-1 index
Panel A: Transition Probabilities
θ0 2.338∗∗∗ θ1 0.136
γ0 1.288∗∗∗ γ1 -0.037
H0 : θ1 = γ1 = 0 LR Test Stat 2.87
Panel B: Expected Returns and Standard Deviations
Non-Crisis Regime Crisis Regime
α σ α σ
ABX AAA-rated asset 0.0341 0.0872 -0.0696 1.6319
(3.30∗∗∗) (31.21∗∗∗) (-0.80) (15.97∗∗∗)
S&P 500 index 0.0780 0.8385 -0.1995 5.0240
(2.37∗∗) (25.39∗∗∗) (-1.29) (11.36∗∗∗)
Aaa corporate spread -0.0025 0.0036 0.0106 0.0114
(-1.26) (27.31∗∗∗) (1.51) (13.77∗∗∗)
One-year T-bill 0.0005 0.0004 -0.0111 0.0062
(0.71) (27.70∗∗∗) (−2.14∗∗) (17.14∗∗∗)
Libor-OIS spread -0.0005 0.0001 0.0027 0.0045
(−2.02∗∗) (26.65∗∗∗) (0.55) (18.67∗∗∗)
VIX Index -0.0722 1.5294 0.1706 10.8485
(−1.65∗) (27.47∗∗∗) (0.71) (12.68∗∗∗)
Notes: Panel A reports the coefficients on the transition probabilities (Eqn. 3) and a likelihood ratio (LR)
test on the null hypothesis that the information variable (lagged return on the AA-rated 06-1 asset) has no
explanatory power over the regime path. Panel B reports the regime-specific constant terms and variances
from Eqn. 1. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels, respectively.
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Table 3: Regime-specific Correlations: Analysis using Traded 06-1 Index
ABX S&P 500 Aaa Spread One-year T-bill Libor-OIS VIX
ABX 1 0.383 -0.270 0.156 -0.023 -0.329
S&P 500 0.366 1 -0.315 0.320 -0.146 -0.830
Aaa Spread -0.200 -0.378 1 -0.401 -0.031 0.241
One-year T-bill 0.060 0.071 -0.215 1 -0.135 -0.288
Libor-OIS -0.013 0.016 -0.050 -0.138 1 0.129
VIX -0.312 -0.833 0.329 -0.061 -0.014 1
Notes: This Table reports the asset correlations generated by our TVTP MS-VAR model. Correlations for
the non-crisis period are reported in the lower triangle of the table, while the crisis period correlations are
presented in the upper triangle.
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Table 4: Tests for Contagion: Analysis using Traded ABX 06-1 index
Contagion from: ABX S&P 500 Aaa Spread One-year T-bill Libor-OIS VIX
To:
ABX - 0.21 0.46 0.85 0.93 0.36
S&P 500 0.34 - 0.23 0.51 0.26 0.04∗∗
Aaa Spread 0.78 0.77 - 0.76 0.03∗∗ 0.69
One-year T-bill 0.85 0.77 0.95 - 0.96 0.45
Libor-OIS 0.89 0.68 0.91 0.22 - 0.42
VIX 0.52 0.22 0.22 0.92 0.10∗ -
Notes: This Table reports the p-values of our Likelihood ratio (LR) tests for contagion between each pair of
assets. Contagion is defined as a statistically significant change in asset relationships between non-crisis and
crisis periods, so our test is based on the null hypothesis of ’No Contagion’, i.e. βij,k(s = 1) = βij,k(s = 2),
where i and j represent the assets under consideration, k the lag and i 6= j. Failure to reject the null
hypothesis implies that asset relationships are stable across regimes. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 5: Model Estimates for Transition Probabilities, Expected Values and Standard Deviations: Analysis
using Spliced ABX index
Panel A: Transition Probabilities
θ0 2.624∗∗∗ θ1 0.266∗∗∗
γ0 1.415∗∗∗ γ1 -0.049
H0 : θ1 = γ1 = 0 LR Test Stat 9.80∗∗∗
Panel B: Expected Returns and Standard Deviations
Non-Crisis Regime Crisis Regime
α σ α σ
ABX AAA-rated asset 0.0296 0.6776 -0.1990 6.5814
(1.05) (30.54∗∗∗) (-1.21) (15.25∗∗∗)
S&P 500 index 0.0923 0.8868 -0.2451 5.1512
(2.80∗∗∗) (26.69∗∗∗) (-1.45) (11.25∗∗∗)
Aaa corporate spread -0.0028 0.0038 0.0125 0.0113
(-1.34) (27.01∗∗∗) (1.66∗) (13.11∗∗∗)
One-year T-bill 0.0003 0.0004 -0.0111 0.0067
(0.48) (27.61∗∗∗) (−1.95∗) (15.74∗∗∗)
Libor-OIS spread -0.0006 0.0001 0.0035 0.0048
(−2.64∗∗∗) (27.02∗∗∗) (0.66) (17.81∗∗∗)
VIX Index -0.0826 1.5888 0.1862 11.3008
(−1.91∗) (28.95∗∗∗) (0.71) (12.02∗∗∗)
Notes: Panel A reports the coefficients on the transition probabilities (Eqn. 3) and a likelihood ratio (LR)
test on the null hypothesis that the information variable (the lagged return on the AA-rated spliced asset)
has no explanatory power over the regime path. Panel B reports the regime-specific constant terms and
variances from Eqn. 1. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 6: Regime-specific Correlations: Analysis using Spliced ABX index
ABX S&P 500 Aaa Spread One-year T-bill Libor-OIS VIX
ABX 1 0.443 -0.254 0.204 -0.018 -0.419
S&P 500 0.324 1 -0.328 0.325 -0.148 -0.828
Aaa Spread -0.175 -0.356 1 -0.412 -0.029 0.244
One-year T-bill 0.080 0.063 -0.228 1 -0.136 -0.291
Libor-OIS -0.040 0.004 -0.046 -0.126 1 0.131
VIX -0.253 -0.836 0.319 -0.056 -0.004 1
Notes: This Table reports the asset correlations generated by our TVTP MS-VAR model, using the spliced
AAA-rated ABX asset as our proxy for the subprime mortgage-backed market. Correlations for the non-crisis
period are reported in the lower triangle of the table, while the crisis period correlations are presented in the
upper triangle.
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Table 7: Tests for Contagion: Analysis using Spliced ABX index
Contagion from: ABX S&P 500 Aaa Spread One-year T-bill Libor-OIS VIX
To:
ABX - 0.20 0.60 0.57 0.69 0.19
S&P 500 0.57 - 0.13 0.55 0.23 0.01∗∗∗
Aaa Spread 0.41 0.40 - 0.52 0.05∗∗ 0.51
One-year T-bill 0.62 0.71 0.98 - 0.66 0.48
Libor-OIS 0.44 0.60 0.90 0.30 - 0.37
VIX 0.45 0.15 0.14 0.87 0.06∗ -
Notes: Here we use the spliced AAA-rated ABX asset to represent the subprime mortgage-backed market.
This Table reports the p-values of our Likelihood ratio (LR) tests for contagion between each pair of assets.
Contagion is defined as a statistically significant change in asset relationships between non-crisis and crisis
periods, so our test is based on the null hypothesis of ’No Contagion’, i.e. βij,k(s = 1) = βij,k(s = 2), where
i and j represent the assets under consideration, k the lag and i 6= j. Failure to reject the null hypothesis
implies that asset relationships are stable across regimes. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% levels, respectively.
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Table 8: Further tests of the role of the Spliced index in explaining the regime path
Panel A: 6-variable models with different samples
Full sample 0.25
Start date: Jul 06 0.55
Start date: Jan 07 0.02
Start date: Jul 07 0.01
Panel B: Lower dimension models (full sample)
Stock market model 0.31
Corporate debt market model 0.36
Treasury market model 0.18
Liquidity market model 0.01
Volatility market model 0.01
Notes: Here we report the p-values of a likelihood ratio (LR) test on the null hypothesis that the information
variable has no explanatory power over the determination of the regime path. In all of these specifications,
the information variable is the AA-rated asset of the spliced index.
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Table 9: Tests for Contagion by Financial Sector: Analysis using Traded ABX 06-1 index
Panel A: Equity Market
H0 : θ1 = γ1 = 0 LR Test Stat 2.44
Contagion from: ABX S&P 500 S&P Financials Libor-OIS
To:
ABX - 0.89 0.40 0.69
S&P 500 0.69 - 0.63 0.12
S&P Financials 0.73 0.20 - 0.03∗∗
Libor-OIS 0.89 0.72 0.74 -
Panel B: Corporate Debt Market
H0 : θ1 = γ1 = 0 LR Test Stat 3.63
Contagion from: ABX Aaa spread Baa spread Libor-OIS
To:
ABX - 0.69 0.59 0.70
Aaa spread 0.02∗∗ - 0.01∗∗∗ 0.07∗
Baa spread 0.75 0.13 - 0.03∗∗
Libor-OIS 0.92 0.67 0.53 -
Panel C: U.S. Treasury Market
H0 : θ1 = γ1 = 0 LR Test Stat 5.41∗
Contagion from: ABX One-year Treasury 10-year Treasury Libor-OIS
To:
ABX - 0.89 0.33 0.70
One-year Treasury 0.92 - 0.92 0.03∗∗
10-year Treasury 0.15 0.98 - 0.05∗∗
Libor-OIS 0.76 0.01∗∗∗ 0.10∗ -
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Table 9: Continued
Panel D: Short-term Funding Markets
H0 : θ1 = γ1 = 0 LR Test Stat 27.81∗∗∗
Contagion from: ABX Libor-OIS ABCP
To:
ABX - 0.68 0.38
Libor-OIS 0.90 - 0.02∗∗
ABCP 0.59 0.000∗∗∗ -
Panel E: Volatility Market
H0 : θ1 = γ1 = 0 LR Test Stat 24.15∗∗∗
Contagion from: ABX VIX Libor-OIS
To:
ABX - 0.30 0.63
VIX 0.08∗ - 0.04∗∗
Libor-OIS 0.78 0.41 -
Notes: For each sector of the financial system, we estimate a separate model as specfied in Eqns 1-3. This
table presents the main results in Panels A-E. In each panel we initially report the likelihood ratio (LR) test
statistic of our test to choose between the FTP model (θ1 = γ1 = 0) and TVTP model. The remainder of
each panel presents p-values for tests of contagion between each pair of markets. The null hypothesis is ’No
Contagion’ and implies βij,k(s = 1) = βij,k(s = 2), where i and j represent the assets under consideration,
k the lag and i 6= j.∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Figure 1: ABX.HE Indexes Values by Vintage of Issue
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Figure 2: Smoothed probability of a Crisis Regime: Analysis using Traded ABX 06-1 index.
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Figure 3: Smoothed Probability of a Crisis Regime: Analysis using Spliced ABX index.
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